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RECENT CASES
percentage of the deficiency that can be denied when there is creditor
misbehavior.43
In the absence of either legislative reform or guidance from the Mis-
souri Supreme Court,44 the law regarding the award of deficiency judg-
ments after creditor misbehavior is unclear in Missouri. Parties to a
security agreement in the Kansas City and Springfield appeals districts will
not know whether their appellate court will follow the St. Louis court and
distinguish between lack of notice cases and cases in which the secured
party buys improperly at his own private sale. It is also unknown whether
the St. Louis court will follow the presumption position when the secured
party buys at his own private sale or whether the court's distinction was
only an easy way to reach a contrary result without contradicting its
parallel courts. Finally, the result in cases involving a sale in which some
aspect is not commercially reasonable is unknown.
EDWAi M. PULTZ
THE JURISDICTIONAL TEST FOR JUDICIAL
REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS
IN MISSOURI
State ex rel. Schneider v. Stewart1
A restaurant-bar license was granted to Malvern, Inc., by the Acting
Supervisor of Liquor Control, Stewart, which permitted Malvern to sell
liquor by the drink. Relators Schneider and the City of Town and
necessary to contest the deficiency judgment. For a general discussion regarding
the award of attorneys' fees to the winning party, see 20 A-m. Jun. 2d Costs §§ 72,
79-81 (1965); Sands, Attorneys' Fees as Recoverable Costs, 63 A.B.A.J. 510 (1977);
Comment, Court Awarded Attorney's Fees and Equal Access to the Courts, 122
U. PA. L. REv. 636, 637-54 (1973-74).
43. One commentator has suggested that a deficiency be denied when the
related purchase is for amounts up to $1500 and for amounts greater than that
the burden of proof be explicitly placed on the secured party. HEuszny, supra
note 8, at 2036.
44. The Gateway case apparently will not be transferred to the Missouri
Supreme Court. Automatics motion to rehear or transfer the case was denied
on February 16, 1979, by the St. Louis Court of Appeals and no motion to transfer
was made to the supreme court within the required 15 days.
1. 575 S.W.2d 904 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1978).
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Country petitioned for a common law writ of certiorari 2 in the circuit
court, and named the Supervisor as defendant.3 Relators alleged that. the
Supervisor's classification of Malvern, Inc., as a resort4 under Missouri's
Liquor Control Law was erroneous, thereby removing any lawful authority
for the license issuance. The writ issued ordering up the records on which
the Supervisor had based his decision.
After certifying the records to the court, defendant Supervisor filed
a motion to dismiss on the ground that neither relator had standing to
challenge the administrative decision. The motion was taken under ad-
visement but later was declared moot after a determination in favor of
defendant Supervisor on the merits. Relators appealed and the standing
issue again was raised by the Supervisor.
The Court of Appeals, Kansas City District, held that the standing
issue involved was jurisdictional and could be considered at any stage of
the proceedings. The court determined that relator Schneider's exclusive
remedy was in the Administrative Procedure and Review Act 5 (APRA),
but that Schneider was not a "person aggrieved" 6 so as to have standing
2. In Missouri, both circuit and appellate courts have jurisdiction to issue
and determine original remedial writs, including the common law writ of cer-
tiorari. Mo. CONsT. art. V, §§ 4.1, 14 (a); State ex rel. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v.
Neaf, 346 Mo. 86, 92, 139 S.W.2d 958, 961 (1940); State ex rel. Modem Fin. Co. v.
Bledsoe, 426 S.W.2d 737, 739 (St. L. Mo. App. 1968). The writ does not issue as a
matter of right, but is discretionary. 346 Mo. at 92, 139 S.W.2d at 962; In re
Hutchinson, 455 S.W.2d 21, 23-24 (Spr. Mo. App. 1970).
The common law writ of certiorari is a command by the issuing court to a
lower judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal for the record of a proceeding in the
lower tribunal to be forwarded to the issuing court. State ex rel. Modem Fin. Co.
v. Bledsoe, 426 S.W.2d 737, 740 (St. L. Mo. App. 1968). The issuing court can
review only questions of law, primarily questions concerning the jurisdiction of
the lower tribunal. State ex rel. Police Retirement Sys. v. Murphy, 359 Mo. 854,
862, 224 S.W.2d 68, 73 (En Banc 1949). The writ does not permit the considera-
tion of evidence or issues of fact. Id. Nonjurisdictional errors may be reached
only if they appear on the face of the record. State ex rel. St. Louis Union Trust
Co. v. Neaf, 346 Mo. 86, 92, 139 S.W.2d 958, 962 (St. L. Mo. App. 1968)..This
degree of review has been termed "narrow in its scope and inflexible in its char-
acter." State ex -el. Police Retirement Sys. v. Murphy, 359 Mo. 854, 862, 224
S.W.2d 68, 73 (En Banc 1949).
3. The petition was brought in three counts: Count I by Schneider as an
individual and owner of property within the City; Count II by Schneider on his
own behalf and on behalf of all other qualified voters in the City; and Count III
by the City of Town and Country. The court did not consider Count II because
Schneider failed to establish the elements for a class action under Mo. Sup. CT. R.
52.08. 575 S.W.2d at 908. Schneider alleged injury in the depreciation in value of
his residence. The City alleged that the grant of the liquor license created a pub-
lic nuisance. 575 S.W.2d at 911, 913.
4. For purposes of Missouri's Liquor Control Law, the definition of
"resort" is set out in RSMo § 311.095 (1978).
5. RSMo § 536.150 (1978).
6. RSMo § 536.150 (1978) contains no specific provision concerning the in-
terest that a litigant must have to employ the remedy contained therein. See note
48 infra. A "person aggrieved" is the requirement for cases brought under RSMo
§ 536.100 (1978). See note 41 infra. The Schneider court would also apply this
standard to § 536.150 cases because "[t]he question is one of aggrievement,
[Vol. 45
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to proceed with this remedy. It was further determined that the City's
only remedy was common law certiorari, but that the City was not a
"party in substance"7 and thus also lacked the requisite interest for stand-
ing. The case was remanded with directions to quash the writ.
Schneider helps clarify a court's jurisdiction to review administrative
decisions. The court's analysis goes beyond the question of legal standing
to seek review and establishes a framework to determine whether a person
has presented a case on which the court can review the merits. Within
this framework, the court implicitly considered a series of questions that
may be summarized 8 as follows:
.1. What is the status of the person seeking judicial review: pri-
vate party, private non-party, or political subdivision?
2. Is the person employing an appropriate remedy9 for his status?
3. Does the person have the requisite personal interest or stand-
ing to proceed with this remedy?
4. Has the person met all procedural requirements necessary to
proceed with this remedy?' 0
If all elements of this test are met, the court can review the challenged
administrative action, restrained only by the scope of the particular remedy
being utilized.
Identifying the preceding issues as jurisdictional" has two significant
whether the administrative decision adversely affects an interest the law protects."
575 S.W.2d at 910. See also State ex rel. Pruitt-Igoe Dist. Community Corp. v.
Burks, 482 S.W.2d 75, 78 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1972).
7. The phrase "party in substance" is generally used to describe the in-
terest that a litigant must have to proceed under common law certiorari. State
ex rel. Stewart v. Blair, 357 Mo. 287, 293, 208 S.V.2d 268, 272 (En Banc 1947).
The Schneider court defined a party in substance as "one who has suffered in-
jury to a substantial interest," where the injury was caused by the challenged
decision. 575 S.W.2d at 910.
8. While the Schneider court did not explicitly set out this series of ques-
tions in its analysis, this approach appears to reflect the analytical process em-
ployed by the court.
9. In the legal sense, the term remedy "signifies and is limited to the
judicial means or method whereby a cause of action may be enforced." I C.J.S.
Actions § 3, at 967 (1936). A remedy is the "means by which a right is enforced."
BLA CK's LAw DICrIoNARY 1163 (5th ed. 1979). See also Merlino v. West Coast
Macaroni Mfg. Co., 90 Cal. App. 2d 106, 115, 202 P.2d 748, 754 (1949); Alamo
Corp. v. Thomas, 186 Tenn. 631, 639, 212 S.W.2d 606, 610 (1948); Goetz v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 31 Wis. 2d 267, 273, 142 N.W.2d 804, 807 (1966).
10. This final question is arguably beyond the scope of Schneider. However,
it is included to make the jurisdictional test complete.
11. The relators in Schneider argued that the standing issue was related
to legal capacity to maintain an action, a defense waived under Mo. Sup. CT. R.
55.27 (a) unless asserted in a timely fashion. The court rejected this assertion,
and held that the issue was jurisdictional. 575 S.W.2d at 909. See also 2 Am. JuR. 2d
Admin. Law § 575, at 393 (1962). See State ex rel. Rouveyrol v. Donnelly, 365
Mo. 686, 698-99, 285 S.W.2d 669, 678 (En Banc 1956).
Missouri decisions have also held that issues concerning a proper remedy and
adherence to the procedures of that remedy are jurisdictional. See Randles v.
Schaffner, 485 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Mo. 1972) (procedure and remedy); Brogoto v. Wig-
gins, 453 S.W.2d 317, 318-19 (Mo. 1970) (remedy); State ex rel. Leggett v. Jenseu,
318 S.W.2d 353, 359-60 (Mo. En Banc 1958) (remedy); Hagen v. Perryville Bd.
of Aldermen, 550 S.W.2d 797, 799 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1977) (procedure); Lafayette
19801
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results. First, any disposition on the merits without jurisdiction is void.12
Second, as the Schneider court specifically held, a jurisdictional issue may
be considered by the court at any stage of the proceedings. 13 In other words,
the litigants cannot confer jurisdiction' 4 nor can they waive jurisdictional
issues.15 A jurisdictional issue can be raised at any point in the proceedings
by a litigant' 6 or by the court sua sponte.17
The initial question of the jurisdictional test involves determining the
status of the person seeking review. The term "private" is used to dis-
Fed. Say. &c Loan Ass'n v. Koontz, 516 S.W.2d 502, 504 (Mo. App., D. St. L.
1974) (procedure); McClain v. Board of Adjustment, 508 S.W.2d 301, 302 (Mo.
App., D. St. L. 1974) (procedure); Moore v. Damos, 489 S.W.2d 465, 469 (Mo.
App., D. St. L. 1972) (procedure); State ex rel. Burns v. Stanton, 311 S.W.2d 137,
140 (K.C. Mo. App. 1958) (procedure). Contra, Bresnahan v. Bass, 562 S.W.2d
385, 389 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1978) (procedure, failure to make timely appeal
under RSMo § 536.110 did not deny the court jurisdiction); Kopper Kettle
Restaurants, Inc. v. City of St. Robert, 439 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Spr. Mo. App. 1969)
(remedy, in. dictum the court said that case would not be dismissed "merely because"
petitioner "misconceives his precisely applicable remedy," however, in its holding
the petitioner was dismissed for that very reason; the court reasoned that the pe-
titioner was bound on appeal to the remedy elected in the trial court); State
ex rel. Bond v. Simmons, 299 S.W.2d 540, 542 (St. L. Mo. App. 1957) (remedy,
review sought under RSMo § 536.100 instead of the appropriate remedy in RSMo
§ 536.150 did not deny the court jurisdiction). Even the Schneider opinion creates
confusion on this matter. Relator Schneider filed for review by common law writ
of certiorari. The court determined that the appropriate remedy was in RSMo
§ 536.150 (1978). Nevertheless, the court did not question its jurisdiction until
it reached the standing issue. 575 S.W.2d at 908-09. Perhaps the confusion in
Schneider can be explained'as a practical result. It would have been a waste of
both the court's and Schneider's resources had the court dismissed the action be-
cause the wrong remedy had been employed without informing Schneider that
he lacked standing even under the appropriate remedy.
The overwhelming weight of authority in Missouri supports the proposition
that questions of standing, remedy, and procedure are jurisdictional issues. Yet,
there is no guarantee that the courts will treat these issues as "purely jurisdic-
tional" in all cases. In any event it is clear that these issues are not considered
to be within the control of the litigants. Like "purely jurisdictional" matters, ir-
regularities cannot be waived by the parties. Lafayette Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v.
Koontz, 516 S.W.2d 502, 504-05 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1974).
12. Randles v. Schaffner, 485 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Mo. 1972); Bash v. Truman, 335
Mo. 1077, 1079, 75 S.W.2d 840, 842 (1934); Lafayette Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
Koontz, 516 S.W.2d 502, 504 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1974).
13. 575 S.W.2d at 909. See Holt v. McLaughlin, 357 Mo. 844, 847, 210
S.W.2d 1006, 1008 (1948); Conrad v. Herndon, 572 S.W.2d 216, 218 (Mo. App.,
D.K.C. 1978).
14. Bash v. Truman, 335 Mo. 1077, 1079, 75 S.W.2d 840, 842 (1934); La-
fayette Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Koontz, 516 S.W.2d 502, 504 (Mo. App., D.
St. L. 1974).
15. Kelch v. Kelch, 450 S.W.2d 202, 204 (Mo. 1970); 575 S.W.2d at 909. See
also State ex rel. Nesbit v. Lasky, 546 S.W.2d 51, 53 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1977);
Lafayette Fed. Say. &c Loan Ass'n v. Koontz, 516 S.W.2d 502, 504-05 (Mo. App., D.
St. L. (1974).
16. Randles v. Schaffner, 485 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Mo. 1972); Foster v. Foster, 565
S.W.2d 193, 195 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1978); Angle v. Owsley, 332 S.W.2d 457,
459 (K.C. Mo. App. 1959).
17. Kelch v. Kelch, 450 S.W.2d 202, 205 (Mo. 1970); Conrad v. Herndon, 572
S.W.2d 216, 218 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1978); Lafayette Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v.
Koontz, 516 S.W.2d 502, 504 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1974).
[Vol.: 45
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tinguish, a party- or .a non-party from a political subdivision.1 8 "Party"
refers to. a person who was a party to the proceedings leading up to the
administrative decision which is being challenged.10. In Schneider, only
Malvern, Inc.,20 and Supervisor Stewart were parties.2 1
A "non-party" includes any person who was not involved in the pro-
ceedings leading up to the administrative decision.22 -Both relators in
Schneider were non-parties: Schneider a private non-party23 and the City
of Town and Country a political subdivision. 24
Once the status of the person seeking review has been determined,
the jurisdictional test next focuses on the available remedies. 2 5 Statutory
provisions authorizing a particular administrative action often include
specific provisions for judicial review. Many of these review provisions are
limited to private parties.26 For example, the Schneider court pointed out
that if Malvern, a private party, had been seeking judicial review, review
18. The importance of this distinction is examined, at note 24 infra.
19. 575 S.W.2d at 909-10. See also State ex rel. Pruitt-Igoe Dist. Community
Corp. v. Burks, 482 S.W.2d 75, 77-78 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1972).
20. Before the appeal, Malvern, Inc., was granted intervention as a de-
fendant under Mo. Sup. CT. R. 52.12. 575 S,W.2d at 907. Of course, this has no
relevance to Malvern's characterization as a "party," a status solely dependent
upon its participation in the administrative proceedings.
21.. The Schneider court was not faced with the need to classify Malvern,
Inc., or Supervisor Stewart because neither was seeking judicial review. Both were
defendants in the case. 575 S.W.2d at 907.
22. . 575 S.W.2d. at 909-10. See also State ex rel. Pruitt-Igoe Dist. Community
Corp..v. Burks, 482 S.W.2d 75, 77-78 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1972,
28. 575 S.W.2d at 909.
24. Id. at 912. A political subdivision appears to include any person or unit
which is acting in a governmental capacity. Kostman v..Pine.Lawn Bank & Trust
Co., 540 S.W.2d 72, 73-74 (Mo. En Banc 1976); State ex rel. St. Francois County
School Dist. R-III v. Lalumondier, 518 S.W,2d 638, 640-42 (Mo. 1975). In other
words, a. political subdivision is one which seeks to protect "public rights" which
have been entrusted to it by state or local government. Id. Accord, In re Roadway,
357 S.W.2d 919 (Mo. 1962). A distinction has been made between a litigant assert-
ing "private rights" and one asserting "public rights." See generally Davis, Stand-
ing of a Public Official to Challenge Agency Pecisions: A Unique Problem of
State Administrative Law, 16 AD. L. REv. 163 (1964).
25. See note 9 supra.
26. In Missouri, see, e.g., agriculture, director of, frozen dessert manufac-
turer's licenses (§ 196.902); agriculture, director of, frozen dessert stop-sale order(§ 196.893); agriculture, director of, milk license proceedings. (§ 416.490); agricul-
ture, director of, milk stop-sale order (§ 416.505); agriculture, director of, stop-sale
order (§ 196.893); bank tax, director's orders (§ 148.070); board of education,
termination of teacher's contract (§ 168.120); board of registration for the healing
arts (§ 334.100); cities, towns, villages, counties, charter form, determination of
nuisance (§ 67.430); corporate franchise tax (§ 147.100); corporations, review of
decisions affecting (§ 351.670); cosmetology, board of (§ 329.150); credit institu-
tions tax, director's orders (§ 148.190); dairy license, suspension or revocation
(§ .196.575); disposal plants, revocation of license (§ 269.110); drugs controlled,
registration, suspension or revocation (§ 195.040); embalmers and funeral direc-
tors, state board of (§ 333.131); finance, director action on banking facilities(§ 862.107); firemen's retirement' system, St. Louis city (§ 87.145); income tax,
assessment by director (§ 143.651); income tax, jeopardy assessments (2 143.891);
income. tax, refund claim denied by director (§ 143.841); insurance, division of,
1980]
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would have been governed by Mo. Rev. Stat. section 311.700.27 When pro-
vided, such a remedy is the exclusive vehicle for judicial review. 28 In other
words, a specific statutory provision for judicial review of a particular ad-
ministrative action normally precludes other general statutory or common
law remedies.29
Some provisions for judicial review of administrative decisions are
cease and desist, injunctions (§ 374.046); insurance, license revocations (§ 375.141);
insurance, public insurance adjusters, license hearing (§ 325.035); insurance direc-
tor, unfair trade practice proceedings (§ 375.944); Kansas-Missouri air. quality
commission (§ 203.600); mediation, state board of, issues between labor organiza-
tion and public body (§ 105.525); merit system (§§ 36.370, .380, .390); motor
fuel use tax (§§ 142.442, .452, .571); motor vehicle fuel distributors, licenses
(§ 142.080); motor vehicle safety inspection permit (§ 307.360); motor vehicle
safety responsibility law (§ 303.290); motor vehicles, lighting equipment (§ 307.035);
nonintoxicating liquor, revocation of licenses (§ 312.370); optometry, board' of(§ 336.180); physicians' or surgeons' licenses, revocation or suspension (§ '34.100);
plumbing and sewer inspection, board of (§ 341.190); police retirement board(§§ 86.037, .227, .740); public service commission (§§ 386.500, .510); real estate com-
mission orders (§ 339.080); social services, department of, director's action
(§ 208.100); social services, department of physical examination reports as evi-
dence (§ 208.075); teachers' license revocation (§ 168.071); unemployment com-
pensation (§ 288.210); workmen's compensation (§§ 287.141, .490).
27. RSMo § 311.700 (1969) provided in part:
Any party to the proceedings who is aggrieved by any final decision, find-
ing, rule or order of the supervisor may file with the supervisor of liquor
control his application for a review within fifteen days after notice of such
decision shall have been mailed to said party. Within ten days after re-
ceipt of such application for review, the supervisor shall transmit to the
circuit court of the county wherein the party aggrieved resides, a certi-
fied copy of the entire record of the proceedings under review, including
a transcript of the evidence heard in cases in which a hearing is required
by law. The filing of such application for review shall not stay enforce-
ment of the supervisor's decision. Such action shall be given precedence
over all other civil cases and shall be heard by the court as soon as possible
after the filing thereof, except that they shall not be heard ahead of cases
arising under the workmen's compensation and unemployment compen-
sation laws of this state. The review shall be conducted by the court with-
out a jury. The reviewing court may affirm the decision of the supervisor
or may reverse or modify it when such decision is not authorized by law
and, in cases in which a hearing is required by law, when such decision is
not supported by competent substantial evidence on the whole record.
The supervisor or any other party to the proceedings may secure a review
of the final judgment of the circuit court by appeal in the manner and
form provided by law for appeals from the circuit court in civil cases. "
This section has been replaced by RSMo § 311.691 (1978). The new provision
provides for review for any person aggrieved by an official action of the Super-
visor of Liquor Control.
28. 575 S.W.2d at 909. See also Brogoto v. Wiggins, 458 S.W.2d 317, 318-19
(Mo. 1970); Kehr v. Garrett, 512 S.W.2d 186, 190 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1974);
American Hog Co. v. County of Clinton, 495 S.W.2d 123, 127 (Mo. App., D.K.C.
1973); In re City of Duquesne, 313 S.W.2d 65, 69 (Spr. Mo. App. 1958). But see
State ex rel. Toedebusch Transfer, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 520 S.W.2d 38,
49 (Mo. En Banc 1975) ("extraordinary circumstances" require use of common
law prohibition).
29. See cases cited note 28 supra. It is the general rule in Missouri, as well
as in other states, that where a statute establishing an agency makes specific pro-
vision for judicial review of the agency's determinations, the statutory method, is
exclusive, i.e., courts will not permit any other method of bringing the adminis-
[Vol. -45
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broad enough to include private non-parties.30 Previous decisions indicated
that such provisions provide the exclusive remedy for a non-party just
trative determination into court for review. Brogoto v. Wiggins, 458 S.W.2d 317,
318-19 (Mo. 1970); In re City of Duquesne, 313 S.W.2d 65, 69 (Spr. Mo. App.
1958); F. COOPER, ADMIINISTRATIVE AGENcIEs AND THE COURTS 331 (1951). For an
in-depth analysis of this exclusivity, see 2 F. COOPER, STATE ADmINISTRATIVE LAw
605-11 (1965). This approach seems contrary to the general rule that unless a re-
medial 'statute contains an express or implied negative, any existing common law
remedy remains, i.e., the statutory remedy is merely cumulative. See Everett v.
County of Clinton, 282 S.W.2d 30, 34 (Mo. 1955); Lajoie v. Central West Cas. Co.,
228 Mo. App. 701, 716, 71 S.W.2d 803, 813-14 (K.C. 1934). Perhaps the exclusivity
rule .can be explained by examining potential alternative remedies. One possi-
bility is an extraordinary writ. These writs, however, will not issue if another
adeqxjate remedy exists. A fortiori an extraordinary writ will not issue where the
legislature has provided a specific statutory remedy. See note 53 infra.
The second alternative remedy might be the Administrative Procedure and
Review Act, RSMo ch. 536 (1978). Yet by expression of legislative intent, APRA
remedies are unavailable if some other provision for judicial review is provided
by statute. RSMo §§ 536.100, .150 (1978). It follows that the specific provision
therefore becomes the exclusive remedy.
30. In Missouri, see, e.g., accountancy board of (§ 326.132); administra-
tive hearing commission (§ 161.332); agricultural product inspector's decisions
(§ 265.070); agriculture, director of, commercial feed law (§ 266.210); agriculture,
director of, meat inspection law (§§ 265.320, .370, .470); agriculture, director of,
pesticide regulation (§ 281.095); air conservation commission (§ 203.130); air con-
servation commission, orders of executive secretary (§ 203.130); ambulance at-
tendants, attendant-driver, hearing on license, revocation, suspension, probation
(3 190.171); ambulatory surgical centers, denial or revocation of license (3 197.221);
banking board from orders of directors of finance (§§ 361.094, .095); blind pen-
sions, decisions of division of family services (3 209.110); board of adjustment, city
zonihig (3 89.110); board of registration for the healing arts (§ 334.160); boarding
houses for the aged, licenses, denied, revoked, or suspended (3 198.430); brucel-
losis control law, impoundment of cattle (3 267.531); casualty and surety rate
regulations (3 379.505); chiropractic examiners, board of (§ 331.070); commercial
feed law (3 266.210); division of health, nursing home licensing proceedings
(8198.141); drainage district assessment (3 242.280); fertilizer regulatory law, ac-
tions of director (3 266.347); finance, director of, financing institutions licensing
law (3 364.040); fire marshal, state (3 320.265); fraternal benefit societies
(§ 378:480); geologist, state, orders of, to oil and gas council (§ 259.100); hazardous
waste management commission (§ 260.400, .415); hospitals, denial or revocation
of license (3 197.071); human rights, commission on (§3 296.050, 314.070); income
tax, revenue, department (3 161.273); income tax sales tax, determinations by
director (§ 144.261); insurance holding companies (§ 382.300); insurance medical
malpractice joint underwriting association law (3 383.190); insurance director,
disapproval- of policy form (§ 376.675); land reclamation commission (§3 444.600,
.680; .700); liquified petroleum gas registration suspension order (3 323.090);
liquor license, suspended or revoked (3 311.691); mental health licensed institu-
tions, licenses denied, suspended, revoked (§ 202.915); milk board, state (8196.959);
mine inspection director (3 293.680); natural resources, department of (3 260.400);
oil and gas council (§ 259.170); pesticides, regulation of (§ 281.095); planning
and zoning decisions, second and third class counties (3 64.660); prevailing wages
on public works, determinations (§ 290.260); radiation control, findings, and or-
ders of division of health (§ 192.470); retirement system, political subdivisions
(3 70.605); sales tax determinations (3 144.261); securities law (3 409.412); small
loans, revocation of licenses (3 367.190); soft drinks, license to manufacturer
(3 196.436); tax commission, state, decisions (3 138.470); taxes, assessments, de-
cisions (3 138.430); title insurance companies (33 381.180, .190); zoning adjust-
ment board, Jackson county (§ 64.281); zoning enforcement officer, second, third
and fourth class counties (3 64.870).
19801
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as for a private party.3 1 The Schneider court, however, suggested that
non-parties may not be so limited, stating: "Other schemes for judicial re-
view of agency action outside the Administrative Procedure and Review
Act enlarge, rather than restrict, citizen access to the courts."3 2
Judicial review of some administrative decisions is mandated by the
Missouri Constitution.33 While it is settled that a constitutional right to
judicial review exists,, it is equally. well established that the power to
provide the method for obtaining judicial review remains in the legisla-
ture.3 4 The Administrative Procedure and Review Act3 5 was enacted in
19453 6 to provide for general implementation of this constitutional right.3 7
The APRA provides a private non-party a remedy for judicial review.38
Schneider indicates that a private party can also seek review under the
Act,39 absent an exclusive remedy elsewhere.4 0
31. State ex rel. Ballard v. Luten, 555 S.W.2d 855, 858 (Mo. App., D..St. L.
1977); In re City of Duquesne, 313 S.W.2d-, 65, 69 (Spr. Mo. App. 1958).. See gen-
erally 2 F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 605-11 (1965).
32. 575 S.W.2d at 911 n.5. This remark appears to indicate that, unlike a
private party, a specific provision for review by a non-party does not preclude
the non-party's use of other remedies. However, if the rationale for declaring that
the specific provision, is exclusive for a private party is sound, there is no ap-
parent reason why it should not be equally applicable to a non-party. See note
28 supra. In addition, this approach has no apparent basis in prior Missouri cases.
Although the court's language does not lend itself easily to another interpre-
tation, a case cited by the court may explain its reasoning. In State ex rel. Sum-
mers v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 366 S.W.2d 738 (K.C. Mo. App. 1963), petitioners
were afforded review pursuant to RSMo § 386.510 (1978) even though they might
not have had a sufficient interest in the subject matter to obtain review through
other remedies. Perhaps the Schneider court's statement that schemes for review
outside the APRA enlarge access to the courts simply means that even though
review is not cognizable through an APRA remedy, another statutory remedy
may exist.
33. Mo. CONsT. art. V, § 18 (amended 1976).
34. Warnecke v. State Tax Comm'n, 340 S.W.2d 615, 618 (Mo.. 1960); State
ex rel. Missouri Power & Light Co. v. Riley, 546 S.W.2d 792, 797 (Mo. App.,
D.K.C. 1977);-Lafayette Fed. Sav. &c Loan Ass'n v. Koontz, 516 S.W.2d, 5.02, 504
(Mo. App., D. St. L. 1974); State ex rel. Burns v. Stanton, 311 S.W.2d 187, 140
(K.C. Mo. App. 1958).
35. RSMo ch. 536 (1978).
36. The original 1945 provisions were part of the Model State Administra-
tive Procedure Act. The ModelAct has been adopted by 27 jurisdictions: Arkansas,
Connecticut, District of Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa,,Louisil-
ana, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Vermont, Washington, .West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
37. State ex rel. Walmar Inv. Co. v. Mueller, 512 S.W.2d 180, 183 (Mo. App.,
D. St. L. 1974).
38. 575 S.W.2d at. 911. See also Bank, of Belton v. State Banking Bd., 554
S.W.2d 451, 454 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1977); State ex rel. Pruitt-Igoe Dist. Community
Corp. v. Burks, 482 S.W.2d 75, 77-78 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1972).
39. 575 S.W.2d at 909. See also State. ex rel. Pruitt-Igoe Dist. Community
Corp. v. Burks, 482 S.W.2d 75, 77-78 (Mo., App., D. St. L. 1972). A private party
clearly may use the .APRA absent an exclusive remedy elsewhere. The maiority of
APRA cases are filed by private parties. See, e.g., Bank of Belton, v. State Bank-
ing Bd, 554 S.W.2d, 451 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1977); State ex rel. Walmar Inv. Co.
v. Mueller, 512 S.W.2d'180 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1974).
40. See notes 26-29 and accompanying text supra.
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Section 536.100, part of the original 1945 enactment,41 provides for
judicial review for "Any person . . . aggrieved by a final decision in a
contested case." 42 A "contested case" is defined by statute as "a proceed-
ing before an agency in which legal rights, duties or privileges of specific
parties are required by law to be determined after hearing."43 This lan-
guage has been construed as including only those cases which statutorily
require, absent waiver,44 a hearing to be held before the administrative
body and a record of the hearing to be made.45 Thus a contested case
need not be "contested" at all.46
There are some cases where administrative action is authorized with-
out a hearing or the making of a record.47 Under the original APRA no
statutory provision provided for judicial review of these decisions. This
void was filled in 1953 by the addition of section 536.150.48 Sections
41. RSMo § 536.100 (1978) provides:
Any person who has exhausted all administrative remedies provided
by law and who is aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case,
whether such decision is affirmative or negative in form, shall be en-
titled to judicial review thereof, as provided in sections 536.100 to
536.140, unless some other provision for judicial review is provided by
statute; provided, however, that nothing in this chapter contained shall
prevent any person from attacking any void order of an agency at any
time or in any manner that would be proper in the absence of this sec-
tion. Unreasonable delay on the part of any agency in deciding any con-
tested case shall be grounds for an order of the court either compelling
action by the agency or removing the case to the court for decision.
42. "Any person" includes a non-party as well as a party. See notes 38-39
supra.
43. RSMo § 536.010 (1978).
44. RSMo § 536.060 (1978) provides:
Nothing contained in sections 536.060 to 536.095 shall preclude the
informal disposition of contested cases by stipulation, consent order, or
default, or by agreed settlement where such settlement is permitted, by
law. Nothing contained in sections 536.060 to 536.095 shall be construed
... to prevent the waiver by the parties (including, in a proper case, tie
agency) of procedural requirements which would otherwise be neces-
sary before final decision, or ... to prevent stipulations or agreements
among the parties (including, in a proper case, the agency).
See also State ex rel. Leggett v. Jenson, 318 S.W.2d 353, 356-57 (Mo. En Banc
1958); Moore v. Damos, 489 S.W.2d 465, 468 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1972); Kopper
Kettle Restaurants, Inc. v. City of St. Robert, 439 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Spr. Mo. App.
1969).
45. Vorbeck v. McNeal, 560 S.W.2d 245, 250 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1977).
See also cases cited note 44 supra.
46. Shewmaker, Procedure Before, and Review of Decision of, Missouri Ad-
ministrative Agencies, 37 V.A.M.S. 145, 164 (1953).
. 47." See, e.g., State ex rel. Leggett v. Jenson, 318 S.W.2d 353 (Mo. En Banc
1958); State ex rel. State Tax Comm'n v. Walsh, 315 S.W.2d 830 (Mo. En Banc
1958); State ex rel. Walmar Inv. Co. v. Mueller, 512 S.W.2d 180 (Mo. App., "D.
St. L. 1974).
48. RSMo § 536.150 (1978) provides:
1. When any administrative officer or body existing under the eonsti-
tution or. by statute- or by municipal charter or ordinance shall have,.
rendered a decision which is not subject to administrative review, de-
termining the legal rights, duties or privileges of any person, including'
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536.100 and 536.150 are mutually exclusive. A person seeking review of a
"contested case" must employ the remedy provided in section 536.100.49
A person seeking review of a "non-contested case" 5 0 must employ the
remedy provided in section 536.150.51
Historically, persons seeking review of administrative decisions have
resorted to various common law remedies, primarily the common law
writ of certiorari. The Schneider court rejected this alternative by holding
that a litigant who is provided a remedy by the APRA is precluded from
using common law certiorari. 52 The rationale is that the common law
writ does not issue in the presence of another adequate remedy.53
the denial or revocation of a license, and there is no other provision for
judicial inquiry into or review of such decision, such decision may be
reviewed by suit for injunction, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition or other
appropriate action, and in any such review proceeding the court may de-
termine the facts relevant to the question whether such person at the
time of such decision was subject to such legal duty, or had such right, or
was entitled to such privilege, and may hear such evidence on such ques-
tion as may be properly adduced, and the court may determine whether
such decision, in view of the facts as they appear to the court, is uncon-
stitutional, unlawful, unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious or involves
an abuse of discretion; and the court shall render judgment accordingly,
and may order the administrative officer or body to take such further
action as it may be proper to require; but the court shall not substitute
its discretion for discretion legally vested in such administrative officer
or body, and in cases where the granting or withholding of a privilege is
committed by law to the sole discretion of such administrative officer or
body, such discretion lawfully exercised shall not be disturbed.
2. Nothing in this section shall apply to contested cases reviewable pur-
suant to sections 536.100 to 536.140.
3, Nothing in this section shall be construed to impair any power to
take summary action lawfully vested in any such administrative officer
or, body, or to limit the jurisdiction of any court or the scope of any
remedy available in the absence of this section.
49. State ex rel. Leggett v. Jenson, 318 S.W.2d 353, 358 (Mo. En Banc 1958);
State ex rel. Walmar Inv. Co. v. Mueller, 512 S.W.2d 180, 183 (Mo. App., D. St.
L. 1974); Moore v. Damos, 489 S.W.2d 465, 468 (Mo. App., D. St. L..1972);
State ex rel. Bond v. Simmons, 299 S.W.2d 540, 542 (St. L. Mo. App. 1957).
50. The term "non-contested case" is not statutorily defined. However,
courts have used the term to encompass those cases which are not "contested
cases," i.e., ases where there is no statutory requirement for a hearing to be held
and a record of the hearing to be made. State ex rel. Wilson Chevrolet, Inc. v.
Wilson, 332 S.W.2d 867, 870 (Mo. 1960); State ex rel. State Tax Comm'n v.
Walsh, 315 S.W.2d 830, 832, 834 (Mo. En Banc 1958).
51. See, notes 49-50 supra.
52. 575 S.W.2d at 908.
53. Id. See State ex rel. Modern Fin. Co. v. Bledsoe, 426 S.W.2d 737, 740
(St. L. Mo. App. 1968); State ex rel. Hamilton v. Guinotte, 156 Mo. 513, 527, 57
S.W. 281, 285 (1900). The same rationale should apply to other common law
remedies since it is generally held that no extraordinary legal or equitable remedy
will lie where another adequate legal remedy exists. See, e.g., State ex rel Keystone
Laundry 9: Dry Cleaners, Inc. v. McDonnell, 426 S.W.2d 11, 15 (Mo. 1968)
(mandamus); State ex rel. Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Meyer, 449 S.W.2d 870, 873
(St. L. Mo. App. 1970) (prohibition); Thompson v. City of Malden, 118 S.W.2d
1059, 1064 (Spr. Mo. App. 1938) (injunction).
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All administrative decisions fall within either section 536.100 or sec-
tion 536.150, with the possible exception of cases where the person seeking
review is a political subdivision.54 If a specific provision outside of the
APRA does not provide an exclusive remedy for judicial review, 5  the
Act becomes the exclusive remedy. Therefore, under Schneider, a private
party or a private non-party never has a common law remedy available. 56
However, this situation should not prejudice private persons, provided
that the litigant meets the statutory requirements of the Act,57 because the
scope of review for common law certiorari is much narrower than the
statutory scope of APRA review. 58
54. See notes 63, 67-69 and accompanying text infra.
55.. See notes 26-32 and accompanying text supra.
56. A question arises as to whether a common law remedy exists when a
litigant has lost his statutory remedy because of reasons such as ladies. By use
of the term "exclusive," the courts seem to infer that if the remedy is lost, it
does not lose its exclusivity, i.e., the litigant still cannot employ other remedies.
It has been held that where a litigant fails to comply with appropriate statutory
schemes outside of the APRA he has no right to proceed with a remedy provided
in the APRA. State ex rel. Johnson v. Burks, 463 S.W.2d 586, 588 (St. L. Mo. App.
1971). It can be expected that if the litigant loses his APRA remedy, courts will
hold that he cannot pursue a common law remedy. This seems consistent with
the general rule of exclusive statutory remedies. Mennemeyer v. Hart, 359 Mo.
423, 429, 221 S.W.2d 960, 963 (1949); State ex rel. Slibowski v. Kimberlin, 504
S.W.2d 237, 240 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1973).
A second question arises where a litigant historically might have been ac-
corded standing to challenge certain administrative decisions before APRA, but
cannot meet the standing requirements of APRA to make a similar challenge.
See notes 73-74 and accompanying text infra.
57, See note 80 and accompanying text infra.
58. Common law certiorari permits only a limited review that has been
described as "narrow in scope and inflexible in its character." State ex rel. Police
Retirement Sys. v. Murphy, 359 Mo. 854, 862, 224 S.W.2d 68, 73 (En Banc 1949);
State ex rel. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Neaf, 346 Mo. 86, 92, 139 S.W.2d 958,
961 (1940). The writ does not permit the consideration of evidence or issues of
fact. State ex rel. Police Retirement Sys. v. Murphy, 359 Mo. at 862, 224 S.W.2d
at 73. Non-jurisdictional errors may be reached only if they appear on the face
of the record. State ex rel. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Neaf, 346 Mo. at 92, 139
S.W.2d at 962.
The scope of review in contested cases under RSMo § 536.100 (1978) is
much broader than this common law remedy. This scope of review is detailed in
RSMo § 536.140 (1978). The power to review evidence when applying the "sub-
stantial and competent evidence" test is a key factor in defining the scope of re-
view in a contested case. Wood v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 355 Mo. 670, 674, 197
S.W.2d 647, 649 (En Banc 1946).
There is some confusion as to the scope of review of a non-contested case
under RSMo § 536.150 (1978). Section 536.150 provides that:
[In any such review proceeding the court may determine the facts rele-
vant to the question whether such person at the time of such decision
was subject to such legal duty, or had such right, or was entitled to such
privilege, and may hear such evidence on such question as may be prop-
erly adduced, and the court may determine whether such decision, in
view of the facts as they appear to the court, is unconstitutional, unlaw-
ful, unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, or involves an abuse of dis-
aetion.
The scope of review provided in § 536.150 clearly is much broader than that
available through common law certiorari. The intent of § 536.150 was that the
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The law has developed anomalously regarding a political subdivision's
right to seek review under the APRA.59 In State ex rel. St. Francois County
School District R-III v. Lalumondier,60 the Missouri Supreme Court con-
cluded ,that a challenge of an administrative decision by a political subdi-
vision in a non-contested case did not involve "private rights" as contem-
plated by article 5, section 18 of the Missouri Constitution.61 The court
further concluded that a political subdivision was not "any person" within
the meaning of section 536.150.62 Therefore, the court determined that a
political subdivision had no constitutional right to review, nor a statutory
remedy in, section 536.150.63
The anomaly is created by the supreme court's previous holding in
In re St. Joseph Lead Co.64 that a political subdivision could seek judicial
review of a contested case under section 536.100.65 The court reasoned that
the constitutional protection of "private rights" in article 5, section -18,
establishes only a minimum standard of review, not a limitation-on the
several types of actions specified therein were to be made more flexible and
adaptable, permitting the court "to determine for itself the facts relevant to' the
question at issue-a sort of statutory certiorari for instance." State ex rel. State
Tax Comm'n v. Walsh, 315 S.W.2d 830, 835 (Mo. En Banc 1958). Section 536.150
does not contemplate a review of a record made before the agency because there is
no requirement that a record be made in non-contested cases. Rather, the remedy
in § 556.150 provides that evidence will be received in the reviewing coiurt and
a record made during review. Id. Therefore, not only does the court -have -the
power to test the evidence under the "substantial and competent evidence"
standard, it must do so to reach a decision. Courts have overwhelmingly agreed
that § 536.150 in effect requires a hearing de novo with the reviewing court func-
tioning essentially as an' administrative tribunal. Schneider, 575 S.W.2d at'908;
Karzin v. Collett, 562 S.W.2d 397, 399 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1978); State ex rel.
Walmar Inv. Co. v. Mueller, 512 S.W.2d 180, 182 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1974).
While Mo. CoNsr. art V, § 18 (amended 1976) does not mandate such a compre-
hensive review-of non-contested cases, it is clear that the legislature has pibvided
a remedy which gives such a statutory right. State ex rel. Leggett v. Jenson, 318
S.W.2d 353, 357-59 (Mo. En Banc 1958); State ex rel. Walmar Inv. Co. 1. Muel-
ler, 512 S.W.2d 180, 182-83 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1974).
While the scope of review under § 536.150 seems clear, a recent -unreported
decision by the Court of Appeals, Kansas City District, evidences some continu-
ing judicial confusion. In Van Kirk v. Board of Police Comm'rs, No. .30313 '(Mo.
App., D.K.C. 1978), transferred,-No. 61170 (Mo. En Banc. Sept.1lf, 1979); the
court held that the circuit court need not review evidence where a litigant'was
seeking review under § 536.150. The court reasoned that Mo. CONST. art V, § 18
did not reach past the contested case in mandating application of the "substantial
and competent evidence" test. Two judges dissented from the majority opinion,
and argued that the weight of authority holds that § 536.150' does provide the
litigant with. a right to have evidence heard in the reviewing court. Upon transfer,
the Missouri Supreme Court disposed of the case on different grounds. Van 'Kirk
v. Board of Police Comm'rs, No. 61170 (Mo. En Banc, Sept. 11, 1979)
59. 575 SW.2d at 912.
60. 518 S.W.2d 638 (Mo. 1975).
61. Id. at 643.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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legislative power to provide for review beyond the minimum standard.66
The court further determined that section 536.100 had broadened the right
to review and that a political subdivision could be "any person aggrieved"
within the meaning of that statute.67
There is no logical basis for the conflict between these two decisions.
It does not appear that the Lalumondier court intended to overrule St.
Joseph Lead.68 Yet the cases are so incongruous that this conflict must be
resolved before the availability of an APRA remedy to a political sub-
division can be properly assessed. 69 This conflict also casts doubt on the
availability of other remedies for a political subdivision. The Schneider
court concluded that the Lalumondier rule denied the City a remedy under
section 536.150. The court thereafter concluded that the City could pur-
sue common law certiorari. 70 However, the holding in Lalumondier was
based on the premise that absent express statutory authorization, no ap-
peal or other review was available for a political subdivision.71 A literal
interpretation of Lalumondier would preclude a political subdivision from
a remedy by any common law method.72
The jurisdictional question of standing follows the determination of
"'remedy. The terminology used in determining standing varies depending
upon the remedy selected.7 3 Irrespective of the terminology used, however,
Schneider holds that the interest required for standing is the same.74 -The
pleadings must allege that the administrative decision has "directly af-
fected an interest in a manner personal and distinct from injury to the
66. Id.. at 660-61.
67. Id. Accord, State ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v. Weinstein, 322
S.W.2d 778, 784 (Mo. En Banc 1959); Smith v. Missouri State Highway Comm'n,
488 S.W.2d 230, 232-35 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1972). But see Kostman v. Pine .Lawn
Bank & Trust Co., 540 S.W.2d 72 (Mo. En Banc 1976); Kansas City v. Reed, 546
S.W.2d 727 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1977).
68. The Lalumondier court cited St. Joseph Lead with approval, -but did
not give recognition to the apparent conflict. 518 S.W.2d at 640..
69. See Note, Standing of Political Subdivisions to Secure Judicial Review ,of
Noncontested Cases In Missouri, 40 Mo. L. Rav. 653 (1975), where the author
advocates adoption of the St. Joseph Lead approach for all cases. See generally 2
F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATiVE LAw 545-51 (1965); 3 K. DAvis, AD INIsTRATIvE
LAw TREATISE § 22.75 (1958); L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTMTIVE
ACTIONs 537-43 (1965); Davis, Standing of a Public Official to Challenge Agency
Decisions: A Unique Problem of State Administrative Law, 16 AD. L. REv.. 163
(1964); Annot., 5 A.L.R.2d 576 (1949).
70. 575 S.W.2d at 912.
71. 518 S.W.2d at 642.
72. Such an interpretation would also preclude the use of any statutory
remedy outside of the APRA, absent express statutory authorization for review
for a political subdivision.
73. See, e.g,, RSMo § 536.100 (1978) (speaks of a "party aggrieved");
RSMo § 386.500 (1978) (speaks of "interested persons"); RSMo § 336.180 (1.978)
(speaks of a "party in interest"). RSMo § 536.150 (1978) makes no proyisioii
concerning the necessary personal interest. The Schneider court held that the
aggrievement standard applied. 575 S.W.2d at 910. Cases involving common law
certiorari speak of a "party in substance." See note 7 supra.
74. 575 S.W.2d at 909. The court did recognize at least one exception. where
the standard is that of an "interested person." Id. at, 911. This exception. is
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public."75 This standard is vague and can be applied only on a case-by-case
basis.7 6 The Schneider court advocated a "strict standing test" to preserve
largely confined to review under RSMo § 386.500 (1978) of the Public Service
Commission Act which provides in part:
After an order or decision has been made by the commission, the public
counsel or any corporation or person or public utility interested therein
shall have the right to apply for a rehearing in respect to any matter de-
termined therein, and the commission shall grant and hold such rehear-
ing, if in its judgment sufficient reason therefore be made to appear....
RSMo § 386.510 (1978) provides for judicial review for persons who are denied
rehearing or are unsatisfied by the result. The standing requirement under §§
386,500, .510 is described in State ex rel. Consumers Pub. Serv. Co, v. Public Se'v.
Comm'n, 352 Mo. 905, 920-21, 180 S.W.2d 40, 46 (Mo. En Banc 1944), with the
court stating:
Considering the Public Service Commission Act as a whole, it seems
apparent that parties to cases before the Commission, whether as com-
plainants or intervenors are not required to have a pecuniary interest,
or property or other rights, which will be directly ori immediately af-
fected by the order sought or even its enforcement.
See also State ex rel. Missouri Power g- Light Co. v. Riley, 546 S.W.2d 792 (Mo.
App., D.K.C. 1977); State ex rel. Summers v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 566 S.W.2d
788 (K.C. Mo. App. 1968); 2 F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 541-44 (1965).
75. 575 S.W.2d at 911.
76. See Hertz Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 528 S.W.2d 952 (Mo. En Banc
1975) (city not aggrieved by valuation set by county board of equalization);
In re Roadway, 357 S.W.2d 919 (Mo. 1962) (private individuals could not appeal
order to vacate road in that the order affected only public interest and not
private rights); State ex rel. Rouveyrol v. Donnelly, 865 Mo. 686, 285 S.W.2d 669
(En Banc 1956) (neither Commissioner of Finance nor bank had standing to chal-
lenge decision of board of bank appeals to grant charter to another bank); Bank
of Belton v. State Banking Bd., 554 S.W2d 451 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1977) (bank
aggrieved by order of Commissioner of Finance); State ex rel. Pruitt-Igoe Dist.
Community Corp. v. Burks, 482 S.W.2d 75 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1972) (tenants
of housing complex not aggrieved by decision of board of building appeals);
Stickelber v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 442 S.W.2d 134 (K.C. Mo. App.
1969) (litigant who was neither a resident nor property owner not aggrieved by
decision' of board of zoning adjustment); Lindenwood Improvement Ass'n v.
Lawrence, 278 S.W.2d 30 (St. L. Mo. App. 1955) (landowners not aggrieved by
decision of the board of adjustment).
For general definitions of the interest requirement, see May Dep't Stores Co.
v. State Tax Commn, 308 S.W.2d 748 (Mo. 1958); Feeler v. Reorganized School
Dist. No. 4, 290 S.W.2d 102 (Mo. 1956); Everett v. County of Clinton, 282
S.W.2d'30 (Mo. 1955); Farmer's Bank v. Kostman, 577 S.W.2d 915 (W.D. Mo.
App. 1979); In re Estate of Soengen, 412 S.W.2d 533 (St. L. Mo. App. 1967);
In re Weston Benefit Assessment Special Road Dist., 294 S.W.2d 358 (K.C. Mo.
App. 1956); Village of Grandview v. McElroly, 222 Mo. App. 787, 9 S.W.2d 829
(K.C. Ct. App. 1928).
Similar standing requirements are found in the federal courts. For influential
recent decisions on the federal approach, see Duke Power v. Carolina Environ-
mental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490
(1975); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm., 418 U.S. 208 (1974); United States v.
Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); United States v. Students Challenging Regu-
latory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405
U.S. 727 (1972); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970); Association of Data
Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). See also 2
F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAiv 535-59 (1965); Hasl, Standing Revisited:
The Aftermath of Data Processing, 18 ST. Louis U.L.J. 12 (1973)..
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the stability and reliability of government rulings in accordance with the
doctrine of administrative finality.7 7
The final question of the jurisdictional test concerns the procedural
requirements of the remedy chosen. Even though it is unclear whether
these requirements are "purely" jurisdictional,7 8 it is dear that a petition
for review may be dismissed because of failure to comply with the pro-
cedural requirements of the appropriate remedy.7 9 The litigant should take
care to choose the correct remedy in the first instance. If he fails to do so,
he may be unable to fulfill timely the remedy's unique procedural require-
ments.8 0
A considerable amount of confusion and conflict has hampered the
right to judicial review of administrative decisions. This state of the law
has continued despite frequent litigation and comprehensive legislative
treatment of the subject. State ex rel. Schneider v. Stewart begins to un-
ravel this confusion with a logical and systematic approach which will pro-
mote certainty in this critical area of law. The jurisdictional test will
generate a body of law which enhances, rather than inhibits, the use of
judicial resources in effectively responding to the present increase in ad-
ministrative action.
RONALD L. BLUNT
77. 575 S.W.2d at 912-13. See Davis, Standing of a Public Official to Chal-
lenge Agency Decisions: A Unique Problem of State Administrative Law, 16 AD.
L. REv. 163 (1964).
78. See note 11 supra.
79. Hagen v. Perryville Bd. of Alderman, 550 S.W.2d 797, 799 (Mo. App.,
D.K.C. 1977); Lafayette Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Koontz, 516 S.W.2d 502, 504
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